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ARTICLE
DEALING FAIRLY WITH ESTATE AND
TRUST BENEFICIARY COMPLAINTS
ROBERT WHITMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The premise set forth in this article is that it is in the interests
of all parties' to an estate or trust administration that complaints by
members of the beneficiary group have a fair hearing. While formal
in-court litigation permits a fair hearing where there are large sums
and/or wealthy complainants involved, it is not an effective
mechanism for "powerless beneficiaries." 2 Various alternative dispute
mechanisms,3 when appropriately employed, can provide a fair
hearing; and it is in the best interests of all of the parties that they be
used.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I would like to thank Sarah
Hakimzadeh for her help with research and editing.
I For example, testator, executor(s), settlor(s), trustee(s), income beneficiaries.
2 See Robert Whitman & Kumar Paturi Improving Mechanisms for Resolving
Complaints of Powerless Trust Beneficiaries, 16 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 64, 70 (2002)
[hereinafter Whitman & Paturi, Improving Mechanisms] ("By 'powerless trust beneficiaries'
reference is made to trust beneficiaries who cannot gain the services of an attorney to carry
out the necessary procedural steps required to bring a trustee before the court. The authors
conclude that far too often numerous hurdles exist in bringing an action in a state court,
resulting in the shielding of an allegedly unscrupubus trustee.').
3 For example, mediation, arbitration. See discussion infra Part V.
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Historically, it has been assumed that the interests of the
parties involved in an estate or trust administration are at odds.
Traditionally, fiduciary accounting has been left until the end of
administration and fiduciary accounting reports have often been
voluminous and difficult to comprehend.4  Now, with technology
providing increased flexibility, this need not be the case. The new
reality is that upgraded levels of accounting services can be provided.
The rising global competition for estate and trust administration
business5 will compel corporate fiduciaries seeking to establish and
retain a reputation for excellence to ensure that beneficiaries receive
accurate and clear accounting information as promptly as possible.
Accordingly, it is in the interest of all of the parties to embrace
appropriate, fair and economically efficient procedures. Trust
beneficiaries are increasingly more aware of the quality of service
offered and are more likely to seek out better service providers. The
common modern practice of including provisions in the governin
document allowing trustee removal makes this possible.
4 Sometimes, the hope was to prevent beneficiaries from asking que stions. Section
7-303(c) of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC reflects this. It only provides that "[ulpon
reasonable request, a beneficiary is entitled to a statement of the accounts of the trust
annually and on termination of the trust or change of the trustee." UNIF. PROBATE CODE §
7-303(c) (1969). 8(11) U.LA. 519 (2006). Similarly, under section 813 of the Uniform Trust
Code (UTC), the trustee is not required to give the beneficiary information about the trust
absent a specific request. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. 609 (2006).
In considering many of the UTC provisions, it must be kept in mind that the National
Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) often finds itself between "a
rock and a hard place." If it bends too far to protect the interests of the beneficiaries, it
faces a lobbying effort to defeat the UTC at the state legislature level. If it bends too far to
give in to intense lobbying efforts by the trustees, it produces the clearly watered down type
of provisions for fiduciary accounting. This being the case, consideration of a "best practices
rule" will often help a practitioner to reach the best result for the client. See infra note 13.
If information were provided automatically rather than on request, beneficiaries would
be able, by virtue of having pertinent information about their trust, to make informed
requests of their fiduciaries as to the proper management and administration of the trust.
See T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee's Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1627 (2007)
(explaining the importance of the trustee's duty to inform the beneficiary and calling for
laws that make the trustee's duty to inform mandatory instead of upon request). Since
providing information to the beneficiary is done only upon request and is not mandated by
law, some beneficiaries are prevented from asking meaningful questions. See also Standish
H. Smith, Reinventing the Corporate Administration of Personal Trusts - A Marketing
Opportunity for Banks, Presentation to the Financial Analysts of Philadelphia, April 20,
2000, at 9, available at http://www.heirs.net/downeads/reinventing.pdf. ("[T]rust
accounting statements to which I have been exposed de not always appear to be models of
clarity or disclosure.').
5 See, e.g., Foreign or Domestic, Trust Companies "Virtually Indistinguishable," TRUST
REGULATORY NEws, June 2007, at 2 (discussing the increased competition domestic trust
companies face as foreign banks establish branches in the U.S. to compete with them).
6 The UTC's trustee removal provisions have significantly liberalized trustee removal.
See Alan Newman, The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose
Property Is It, Anyway? 38 AKRON L. REV. 649, 695-98 (200-D (explaining how the UTC's
trustee removal provisions significantly expand the common law grounds for changing
trustees). For a discussion of how liberal trustee removal procedures permit trust
QUINNIPIAC PROBATE LAW JOURNAL
Furthermore, beyond proper investment and loyalty, the broader,
rising concept of "fiduciary duty" requires both a general duty of
fairness in all cases and the efficient settlement of unresolved
disputes through the suggestion of a proper resolution procedure.
This concept makes it essential that beneficiary complaints be dealt
with fairly.7
II. TRADITIONAL THINKING REGARDING TREATMENT OF
BENEFICIARY COMPLAINTS
Early on at common law, the hope was that fiduciaries, having
taken an oath, would voluntarily and unselfishly elevate the interests
of the beneficiary group above their own in the administration of an
estate or trust. 8  Regrettably, experience taught our medieval
ancestors that, in some cases, human nature and circumstances
thwarted this expectation. 9 At that point, the equity court agreed to
hear complaints of the beneficiary group, commencing the process of
beneficiaries greater freedom and flexibility in "shopping" for a fiduciary, see Ronald
Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the Uniform Trust
Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lens Help Clarify the Rights of
Beneficiaries? 67 MO. L. REV. 241 (2002).
7 Trusts scholar John H. Langbein defines fiduciary duty as requiring primarily proper
investment and loyalty. He writes, "[all trust fiduciary law rests on two core principles, the
care norm (the duty of prudent administration) and the loyalty norm (the duty to administer
the trust for the benefit of the beneficiary). The many subrules-for example, the duties to
keep and disclose reords; to collect, segregate, earmark and protect trust property; to
enforce and defend claims; to be impartial among multiple beneficiaries-are all applications
of prudence and byalty." John H. Langbein, Rise of the Management Trust, TRUSTS &
ESTATES, October 2004, at 54. The duty of loyalty argued for in this article is much broader.
This broader fiduciary duty implies that in every situation, the fiduciary has a duty to be
honest and fair. To say that a fiduciary's duty to "keep and disclose records; to Collect,
segregate, earmark and protect trust property; to enforce and defend claims; to be impartial
among multiple beneficiaries" and to acount in a meaningful and user friendly way are
merely "subrules" is to minimize the importance of these duties. For a discussion of proper
resolution procedures, see infra Part VI.
8 Originally, uses and trusts were not enforceable in any court but were purely honorary.
The performance of the feoffee's duties was voluntary to uses and could not be enforced.
See GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 3, at
19-22 (2d ed. 1984) (1965) [hereinafter BOGERT ON TRUSTS]; see also AUSTIN W. SCOTT &
WILIUAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 12-14 (4th ed. 1987) (1939) [hereinafter SCOTT
ON TRUSTS].
9 Since early trusts were originally honorary, "[i]f the feoffee to uses saw fit to deny that
he held the property for another, and appropriated it to his own use, he might do so with
impunity." BOGERT ON TRUSTS, supra note 8, § 3, at 21. In medieval times, to curb feudal
bloodshed, monks sought to administer sacred oaths known as the 'Truce of God" whereby
the oath taker foreswore violence against certain classes of people and property or on
certain days of the week. These oaths were routinely broken when they no bnger served
the interests of the warlords. See RODULFUS GLABER, THE FIVE BOOKS OF THE HISTORIES
(John France ed., Clarendon Press 1989).
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in-court formal litigation to remedy breaches of fiduciary duty.'"
In those bygone days, being that few individuals died with
substantial wealth, the formal, in-court litigation process served
reasonably well to monitor claims of breach of fiduciary duty. Later,
when corporate entities were allowed to serve as fiduciaries for a fee"
and many more persons died with wealth, estate and trust
administration grew into a profitable and complex business. 12 As the
power of corporate fiduciaries grew in the United States, they came to
represent a powerful lobby. As a result, legislation favoring corporate
fiduciaries was widely enacted. 3 Beyond that, corrupt practices grew
10 Once it became clear that trustees could not be relied on to keep their promises,
"beneficiaries of uses alleging loss due to a failure of the feoffees to uses to hold the property
for their use should apply to the chancellor for relief. At some time early in the fifteenth
century the justice of these petitions began to be recognized by the chancellor, and uses and
trusts were enforced." BOGERT ON TRUSTS, supra note 8, § 3, at 22.
11 Originally, only individuals could serve as trustees and were not allowed to charge fees
for their services. See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 8, § 1.8, at 27-28. 'The great
contribution made by America to the develepment of the trust is in the emplyment of the
corporate trustee. In England as late as 1743, the Attorney-General argued that a
corporation could not be a trustee. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, however, told the Attorney-
General that nothing was clearer than that corporations might be trustees. The earliest
instance in the United States of a specific grant to a corporation of the power to act as
trustee seems to have been that of the Farmers' Fire Insurance & Loan Company, chartered
in New York in 1822. Since that time, the creation of corporations with power to administer
trusts has become increasingly common. The Congress finally found it necessary to permit
national banks to enjoy similar powers. Although the corporate trustee is primarily an
American institution, the institution is spreading to other countries, and even in the more
conservative mother country the corporate trustee is becoming common.... In England, the
individual trustee receives no compensation for his work, unless it is otherwise provided by
the trust instrument. In the United States, however, he [uniformly] receives
compensation." Id. (internal citation omitted). See also Robert Whitman, Resolution
Procedures to Resolve Trust Beneficiary Complaints, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 829, 844
(2005).
12 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 8, § 1.8, at 28. "In the United States, however, [the
trustee] receives compensation. The result is that in the older communities it is not
uncommon to find men who make a profession of acting as trustees. The trust companies
and banks that have trust powers are of course professional trustees; they are in the
business of administering trusts." Id.
13 See generally Standish H. Smith, Reforming the Corporate Administration of Personal
Trusts - The Problem and a Plan, 14 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 563, 564-65 (2000) ("[flhe legal
playing field between a corporate trustee and the beneficiaries of a personal trust can be
unbalanced in favor of the former, a situation which is sometimes exploited by banks to a
point that may at times compromise a corporate trustee's duty of loyalty." Smith argues that
changes to the current law must be made to offset existing "federal and state law that serve
the banking interests, but not necessarily those of the consumer, and . . . prevent the
industry from continuing to use its deep pockets and financial sophistication in a manner
sometimes detrimental to beneficiaries."). Many commentators conclude that the NCCUSL
is strongly influenced by powerful lobbying groups. These authors contend that politics
influence the NCCUSL and that rules are adopted when and because interest groups
influence the process. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of
Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 597 (1995) ('These ... rules ordinarily advance
the interest group's agenda.'); see also Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L.
REv. 555, 573-74 (2008) (recent trends suggest that beneficiaries have begun to lobby for
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because all fiduciaries were placed in a position where they could be
tempted to place their own interests over those of the beneficiary
group. These corrupt practices developed as a way to enrich
fiduciaries at the expense of beneficiary groups that were not
organized in a manner that would allow them to balance the power
exerted by fiduciaries and their counsel. Consequently, the public
developed a fear of gettin 4involved with lawyers, fiduciaries, and the
probate system generally.
Whereas wealthy beneficiaries can still afford to protect their
interests by retaining counsel and litigating in court, poorer
beneficiaries with smaller claims often find themselves barred from
any form of redress for claimed wrongs.
III. WHY POWERLESS BENEFICIARIES TODAY MAY NOT BE
ABLE TO RECEIVE A FAIR HEARING OF THEIR
COMPLAINT
If a complaining beneficiary is "powerless' 15  and/or the
complaint is not for a large amount, it may not be possible to retain a
lawyer to represent the beneficiary. The beneficiary is unable to pay
an attorney on an hourly rate basis and the amount at issue will
make a contingent fee arrangement unattractive to the attorney.
Furthermore, in situations where the corporate fiduciary is a major
bank in the area, attorneys may choose not to take the case because of
new legislation to reduce power of trustees in existing probate law).
Statutory provisions governing trustee removal made removal difficult. See Charles E.
Rounds, Jr., LORING: A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK § 7.2.3.6 (2003) [hereinafter LORINU] (quoting
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706 cmt.) ('Removal may be ordered because of hostility between the
trustee and a beneficiary, but only in rare cases. [R]emoval... [, for example,] ... might be
justified if a communications breakdown is caused by the trustee or appears to be incurable.
On the other hand, relief has been denied if the trustee's duties are essentially ministerial
or if the proper administration of the trust is not jeopardized by the hostility." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)). This, in turn, made it common for
draftsmen to provide for literal removal provisions in the governing instrument.
14 It is quite common to hear dissatisfaction voiced concerning the capability of fiduciaries.
See Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium,
or. We Don't Have to Think of England Anymre. 62 ALB. L. REV. 543. 549 (1998) ("[it
seems that fiduciary duty, or to speak more broadly, fiduciary responsibility, is losing some
of its Dower as an organizing rinciple in the trust world. Fewer and fewer ueople believe in
fiduciary duty, unless someone is watching.... Stating it more broadly, one could fill a hall
with people who would say the traditional doctrine of trustee duty and accountability is
more moth-eaten than it is modem.'); see also NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE
(1st ed. 1980); see also Robert Whitman, Disclosure Strategies to Settle Complaints and
Avoid Formal Litigation, SK089 ALI-ABA 481, 486( (Feb. 10-11, 2005) ("Just one complaint
that is NOT FAIRLY HEARD can have enormous fall out in providing the public with a
negative feeling for the entire estate and trust system.').
15 Seesupranote2.
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conflicts or fear that they will lose future business. 16
It is most likely that in the majority of estate and trust
administrations occurring in the United States today, fiduciaries and
their counsel act responsibly and treat members of the beneficiary
group fairly. The reality, however, of estate and trust administration
is that it often presents difficult issues in which the interests of a
fiduciary and the members of the beneficiary group clash. As such, a
proper balanced resolution of the issues presented is, at times,
unclear. Various members of the beneficiary group may have
opposing interests and issues may arise concerning the interpretation
of the governing instrument, use of discretionary authority,
reasonableness of fees, prudent investment and diversification, etc.
It is not clear exactly how many beneficiary complaints arise
annually in the United States. Of those complaints, it is unknown
what percentage are totally unfounded, border on being justified, or
will likely be found to be justified if a fair hearing takes place. Given
the volume of trust business as compared to the known level of
complaints, it seems evident that most often, complaints do not arise.
But what is equally apparent is that, particularly when a major
corporate fiduciary is involved, a "powerless beneficiary" asserting a
relatively small claim may be unable to retain the services of a
competent lawyer to represent the beneficiary's interests.
Consequently, the beneficiary may be denied a fair hearing of the
complaint.
IV. THE FIDUCIARY'S INTERNAL PROCESS OF RESOLUTION
In many cases, a fiduciary's prompt response to a beneficiary's
complaint can lead to its prompt resolution. Often, the beneficiary
group may lack an understanding of the circumstances or the various
competing factors that the fiduciary needs to consider in making
decisions. 17
16 See Whitman & Paturi, Improving Mechonisms, supra note 2, at 77.
17 BOGERT ON TRUSTS, supra note 8, § 961, at 2, 4 ('That the settlor has created a trust
and thus required that the beneficiary enjoy his property interest indirectly does not imply
that the beneficiary is to be kept in ignorance of the trust, the nature of the trust property
and the details of its administration . .. it is the duty of the trustee to give the beneficiary
the information which he has asked."); see also Jo Ann Engelhardt & Robert W. Whitman,
Administration with Attitude: When to Talk, When to Walk, PROB. & PROP., May-June 2002,
at 13 ("The consensus is that if the fiduciary can improve its communications, it will avoid
many problems and mitigate antagonism among the parties if problems occur.'); Robert
Whitman, Disclosure Strategies to Settle Complaints and Avoid Formal Litigation, SK089
ALI-ABA 481, 514 (Appendix D) (Feb. 10-11 2005) (response of James Wade stating, "[i]t
has been my experience that most disputes between beneficiaries and trustees are a result
of poor communication, particularly a failure on the part of the trustee to see that the
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Because a fiduciary is bound by fiduciary law to place the
interests of the beneficiary above its own, failing to communicate
effectively or displaying a lack of interest in seeing that the
beneficiary's concerns are promptly and fully addressed appears to
constitute an independent breach of fiduciary duty, separate from the
original complaint. Beneficiaries who are ignored become irate and
overly suspicious."s Ideally, at the outset of administration, ' 9 every
fiduciary will outline to the beneficiary the fiduciary's written policies
for internally resolving disputes, so as to minimize confusion and
conflict.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
In situations where formal, in-court litigation may not be
feasible in practice, alternative dispute resolution becomes important.
While beneficiaries opting for formal litigation should never be
prevented from taking that route, it is most important that a
complaining beneficiary understand: 1) the internal process of
resolution available to the fiduciary, 2) the fiduciary's written policies
with regard to providing a "proper resolution process," and 3) the
beneficiary understands the ground rules for estate and trust administration (including
such items as pass through to the beneficiary of trust income, how charges for trustee and
other administration expenses are charged against income or principal or a combination,
and how investment receipts are allocated as between the principal and income accounts)').
18 Whitman, supra note 11, at 838 ("For example, consider the plight of RK, a trust
beneficiary who sought an accounting from her out-of-state trustees. RK believed she was
entitled to approximately $30,000. After consistent stonewalling, RK sent the trustees a
letter in which, because of her total frustration, she accused them of being 'crooks' (which
they may well have been). The trustees counterclaimed for defamation and received a
default judgment against RK in their home state. RK could not afford to travel to court to
defend herself. The judgment, by an allegedly 'friendly' judge, was for $2,000,000."); see also
Robert Whitman, Sorting Out Receipts and Releases, 33 ACTEC J. 142, 143 (2007) ("Heavy-
handed negotiating strategies, such as giving unreasonable ultimatums, may totally
undermine goodwill. As an example, a trustee who requires the execution of [a] R[eceipt]
and R[elease] without disclosing how much the beneficiary can expect at the distribution
and the amount of trustee fees should expect the beneficiary to be cautious and
suspicious.').
19 Engelhardt, supra note 17, at 13 ("Many commentators recommend that a fiduciary
present a written summary of the trust terms and a statement of both the fiduciary's duties
and responsibilities and the beneficiary's rights and remedies at the beginning of the
relationship. This lets the beneficiary know what to expect and allows the fiduciary to
manage the beneficiary's expectations.'); see also Robert Whitman, Sorting Out Receipts and
Releases, SNO03 ALl-ABA 281, § 1.3, at 288 (July 19-20 2007) ('The beginning of the
fiduciary relationship presents significant tactical opportunities for fiduciaries to advise the
beneficiary group regarding what will be happening at various stages of the administration.
Hopefully, from the outset, the beneficiary group has no distrust, nor suspicion concerning
the fiduciary. The fiduciary, at the beginning of the relationship, can review numerous
administrative and procedural matters, outlining the benefits and responsibilities arising
pursuant to the new fiduciary relationship. Presenting a clear picture of what will be
coming avoids later unexpected surprises.').
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beneficiary's right to participate in the process of designing a proper
resolution process.
VI. FIDUCIARY POLICIES REGARDING PROPER RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES
If standard internal processes of resolution cannot resolve a
beneficiary complaint and the beneficiary does not opt for formal
litigation, the stage is set for the fiduciary to put into effect the
fiduciary's policy regarding the creation of a "proper resolution
procedure."
Arguably, to meet a fiduciary's duty, every fiduciary must
have a written form of policies in place outlining the steps to be taken
to establish a "proper resolution procedure."2 ° Ideally, the fiduciary
should have disclosed these procedures to all members of the
beneficiary group at the outset of administration.2'
Among the goals to be reached in formulating the fiduciary's
policies should be the goal of allowing the beneficiary to work with the
fiduciary in choosing the particular plan to be established to resolve
the matter. Depending on the circumstances of the case, arbitration,
mediation, the appointment of an independent resolution officer, or
any combination of the above mechanisms that appear to meet the
needs of the parties in a balanced way should be made available.22
20 See Donald P. DiCarlo, Jr., Using Fiduciary Procedures to Build Beneficiary Buy-In,
SK004 ALI-ABA 53, 56 (July 1-2, 2004) (calling for reforms aimed at increasing the amount
of beneficiary and trustee cooperation by establishing mediation procedures to resolve
potential conflicts and creating a system for the beneficiary to provide the trustee with both
negative and positive feedback on the current administration of the trust); see also Robert
Whitman, Flexible Fiduciary Accounting from the Outset of Administration, PROB. & PROP.,
May-June 2004, at 45.
21 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(2) (1959) ('The trustee, in dealing with
the beneficiary on the trustee's own account, is under a duty to the beneficiary to deal fairly
with him and to communicate to him all material facts in connection with the transaction
which the trustee knows or should know.').
22 Whitman & Paturi, Improving Mechanisms, supra note 2, at 72 n. 12 ("[The authors
[argue for] the possibility of a broad-based voluntary system for trust beneficiary insurance
that would give powerless trust beneficiaries early access to competent legal advice. Another
possibility would be for trustees to voluntarily set up independent fact finding agencies to
resolve complaints by mediation and/or arbitration.'); see also Bridget A. Logstrom, Bruce
M. Stone & Robert W. Goldman, Resolving Disputes with Ease and Grace, 31 ACTEC J. 235,
236-37 (2005) (elucidating the advantages of arbitration of trust & estate disputes as
opposed to formal, in-court litigation, among which include the reduced cost and time of
arbitration and the benefit of allowing the parties to tailor the arbitration procedure
according to the needs of their specific dispute).
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VII. SHOULD AN ATTEMPT BE MADE TO DRAFT A PROPER
RESOLUTION PROCEDURE INTO THE GOVERNING
DOCUMENT?
Since it is impossible to predict the kinds of problems that will
arise in the future, the only provision that need be drafted into the
governing instrument should be the following:
If a dispute arises between the fiduciary and/or one or
more members of the beneficiary group, the fiduciary
shall work with the complainant to adopt a proper
resolution procedure in order to promptly and
economically resolve the dispute.
An attempt to set out more rigid procedures in the governing
document will likely be counterproductive. No one can accurately
anticipate the set of circumstances that may come to exist at the time
when the complaint arises.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Practices in which politically strong groups representing
fiduciaries lobby for legislation to protect their interests and leave
other interested groups, such as trust beneficiaries, unprotected fail to
maximize the public's acceptance and endorsement of our estate and
trust administration system in the long term. Global competition will
compel the United States to reorganize its estate and trust
administration systems if it is to retain a leadership position. It is in
the long term interests of all of the parties to seek a balanced system
that allows for a fair hearing of beneficiary complaints.
[Vol. 22
